En: https://www.bis.org/statistics/gli/glibox_feb15.htm
Since mid-2014, after remaining relatively stable for four years at close to $100, the price of crude oil has dropped by roughly 50% in US dollar terms. 1
Changes in production and consumption seem to fall
short of a fully satisfactory explanation of the abrupt collapse in oil
prices. The last two episodes of comparable oil price declines (1996 and
2008) were associated with sizeable reductions of oil consumption and,
in 1996, with a significant expansion of production. This seems to be in
stark contrast to developments since mid-2014, during which time oil
production has been close to prior expectations and oil consumption has
been only a little weaker than forecast (Graph 1, left-hand panel).
Rather, the steepness of the price decline and very large day-to-day
price changes are reminiscent of a financial asset. As with other
financial assets, movements in the price of oil are driven by changes in
expectations about future market conditions. In this respect, the
recent OPEC decision not to cut production has been key to the fall in
the oil price.
However, other factors could have exacerbated the fall
in oil prices. One important new element is the substantial increase in
debt borne by the oil sector in recent years. The greater willingness of
investors to lend against oil reserves and revenue has enabled oil
firms to borrow large amounts in a period when debt levels have
increased more broadly. Issuance by energy firms of both investment
grade and high-yield bonds has far outpaced the already substantial
overall issuance of debt securities (Graph 1, right-hand panel).
The greater debt burden of the oil sector may have
influenced the recent dynamics of the oil market by exposing producers
to solvency and liquidity risks. Lower prices tend to reduce the value
of oil assets that back the debt. Indeed, spreads on energy high-yield
bonds widened from a low of330 basis points in June 2014 to over 800
basis points in January; spreads on total high-yield debt have also
widened, but not nearly as much. Against this background of high debt, a
fall in the price of oil weakens the balance sheets of producers and
tightens credit conditions, potentially exacerbating the price drop as a
result of sales of oil assets (for example, more production is sold
forward). Second, in flow terms, a lower price of oil reduces cash flows
and increases the risk of liquidity shortfalls in which firms are
unable to meet interest payments. Debt service requirements may induce
continued physical production of oil to maintain cash flows, delaying
the reduction in supply in the market. An additional factor that may
amplify the oil price decline is that many oil firms located outside the
United States have nevertheless borrowed in US dollars. As the
left-hand panel of Graph 2 shows, oil firms in emerging market economies
(EMEs) have seen the steepest increases in debt. If a stronger dollar
were to be accompanied by more stringent financial conditions, then EME
oil firms, which have increased borrowing significantly, could be
particularly adversely affected.
Ample market liquidity had facilitated hedging through
oil derivatives markets in the years before the recent price collapse.
Selling futures or buying put options are ways for oil producers to
hedge their exposure to highly volatile oil revenues. The short side of
the market has been dominated historically by "merchants", ie agents
engaged in the production or processing of oil. Since 2010, oil
producers have increasingly relied on swap dealers as counterparties for
their hedging transactions. In turn, swap dealers have laid off their
exposures on the futures market as suggested by the trend increase in
the CFTC short futures positions of swap dealers over the 2009-13 period
(Graph 2, righthand panel).
However, at times of heightened volatility and balance
sheet strain for leveraged entities, swap dealers may become less
willing to sell protection to oil producers. The co-movement in the
dealers' positions and bouts of volatility suggests that dealers may
have behaved procyclically - cutting back positions whenever financial
conditions become more turbulent. In Graph 2, three such episodes can be
seen: the onset of the Great Recession in 2008, the euro area crisis
combined with the war in Libya in 2011, and the recent price slump. In
response to greater reluctance by dealers to take the other side of
sales, producers wishing to hedge their falling revenues may have turned
to the derivatives markets directly, without going through an
intermediary. This shift in the liquidity of hedging markets could have
played a role in recent price dynamics.
Taken together, the interaction of oil prices and the
debt and balance sheet capacity of intermediaries introduce a new
element into the discussion of oil market developments. The build-up of
debt in the oil sector is a reminder that high debt levels can induce
significant macro-financial interactions. Such interactions need to be
understood better in order fully to appreciate the macroeconomic impact
of falling oil prices.
1
This box contains initial findings of a BIS analysis of the oil-debt
nexus. The full study is forthcoming in the March, 2015 issue of the BIS Quarterly Review.
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